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Using SAT Solvers to Finding Short Cycles in
Cryptographic Algorithms
Władysław Dudzic, and Krzysztof Kanciak
Abstract—A desirable property of iterated cryptographic al-
gorithms, such as stream ciphers or pseudo-random generators,
is the lack of short cycles. Many of the previously mentioned
algorithms are based on the use of linear feedback shift registers
(LFSR) and nonlinear feedback shift registers (NLFSR) and their
combination. It is currently known how to construct LFSR to
generate a bit sequence with a maximum period, but there is no
such knowledge in the case of NLFSR. The latter would be useful
in cryptography application (to have a few taps and relatively
low algebraic degree). In this article, we propose a simple
method based on the generation of algebraic equations to describe
iterated cryptographic algorithms and find their solutions using
an SAT solver to exclude short cycles in algorithms such as stream
ciphers or nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR). Thanks to
the use of AIG graphs, it is also possible to fully automate our
algorithm, and the results of its operation are comparable to the
results obtained by manual generation of equations. We present
also the results of experiments in which we successfully found
short cycles in the NLFSRs used in Grain-80, Grain-128 and
Grain-128a stream ciphers and also in stream ciphers Bivium
and Trivium (without constants used in the initialization step).
Keywords—NLFSR, short cycles, stream ciphers, Trivium,
Bivium, Grain-80, Grain-128
I. INTRODUCTION
THE phrase SAT solver is commonly used to refer tosoftware that solves the boolean satisfiability problem
(sometimes called propositional satisfiability problem and ab-
breviated SATISFIABILITY or SAT). It finds the evaluation
of variables (0 or 1) for which all logical formulas of a given
problem are met. This problem is an NP-complete problem
as demonstrated by Stephan Cook in [17]. Currently there
is no known algorithm which would effectively solve every
SAT problem, and it is believed that such an algorithm does
not exist. However, proof of this hypothesis has not been
carried out. There are many recognized SAT solvers which
use heuristic methods of solving the SAT problem. These can
be grouped according to technique, e.g. DPLL (Davis-Putnam-
Logemann-Loveland [11]) and CDCL (Conflict Driven Clause
Learning [12]).
In cryptology, SAT solvers are successfully used among
other methods in issues related to cryptanalysis of block
and stream ciphers [14], hash functions [7], and in methods
related to formal verification, automatic test pattern generation
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and logic synthesis [18]. The idea of using SAT solvers to
search for short cycles of length n in iterated cryptographic
algorithms (like stream ciphers) or primitives (like LFSR) is
based on describing the n-iteration of an algorithm by an
algebraic system of equations, adding equations where initial
internal state equals final internal state, and then solving this
system using an SAT solver. When the problem is unsatisfiable
(unsat) the cycle of length n does not exist, but when it is
satisfiable (sat), the n-cycle exists, and we get the initial value
of the internal state. No known algorithm can check whether
the NLFSR or stream cipher has a full period with at least
polynomial complexity.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Using SAT solvers to find short cycles in cryptographic
algorithms is a relatively new approach, and the most promis-
ing results can be found in [6] and [5]. Table I shows the
results of searching for short cycles in the NLFSRs used in
Grain-80 and Grain-128 stream ciphers, and also in stream
ciphers Bivium and Trivium (without constants used in the
initialization step) presented in [5]. Cycles of length 1 consist
of all 0. The experiments were run on a PC with Intel Core
i7-4600U CPU at 2.1 GHz with 8 GB RAM running under
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
Due to the addition of further conditions during calculations,
the algorithm proposed in [5] makes it possible to find all
cycles; however, its operation time is not satisfactory.
Currently, the search of NLFSRs with a maximum period
is also an important issue. The articles [15] and [21] show
results of searching such primitives using FPGA and [20] using
GPGPU. However, a state of found registers is not to large.
It can be proved [19] that only nonsingular NLFSR may
have a maximum period. The register is nosingilar if his
feedback function has the form:
f(x0, x1, · · · , xn−1) = x0 + g(x1, · · · , xn−1)
when we rotate register in left or:
f(x0, x1, · · · , xn−1) = xn−1 + g(x0, · · · , xn−2)
when we rotate register in right.
In other case is called singular [15]. However in general,
it is not know how to construct NLFSR with large state and
maximum period witch is cryptographically applicable.
III. EXPERIMENT
The proposed algorithm to find a cycle of length n consists
of three steps:
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TABLE I
RUNTIME, T, AND PEAK MEMORY CONSUMPTION, M (IN
KBYTES), USED BY THE ALGORITHM TO FIND N CYCLES OF
LENGTH K. [5]
1) generation of algebraic equations describing n iterations
of cryptographic algorithms in algebraic normal form
(ANF),
2) converting ANF to conjunctive normal form (CNF),
3) solving CNF problem using SAT solver.
In our experiments, we used two methods to generate alge-
braic equations that describe iterated cryptographic algorithms.
The first is based on manually generated equations. Handwrit-
ten equations seem to be the most natural and readable for
humans. For example, if the feedback function of NLFSR is:
f(x0, x1, x2, x3) = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x1 · x3
we can describe 2 iterations of register using the equations:








and add conditions where the initial internal state is equal to






• x0 x1 x2 x3 - initial internal state
• x4 x5 x6 x7 - state after first iteration
• x8 x9 x10 x11 - state after second iteration
The second method uses automatically generated equations
(based on Cryptol implementation which is translated to the
and-inverted-graphs (AIG [2])) and converts them into ANF. In
this process we use SAW [9] and ABC [22] from UC Berkeley.
The idea of using an equation taken from implementation
was earlier explored by Courtois et al. [14] to conduct an
SAT attack on DES block cipher. In 2012, during SHA-
3 competition, Homsirikamol et al. [7] developed a similar
tool to obtain hardware equations that described SHA-3 final
candidates and evaluated their security margin.
The conversion of ANF to CNF is performed using a
modification of US open-source software available at https:
//www.lukbettale.ze.cx/anf2cnf. During conversion, the CNF
CUT parameter is always set to 3. It is possible that other
conversion methods may affect the effectiveness of solving
CNF problems. However, we have not yet conducted research
in this area.
To solve a CNF problem, we used a Plingeling SAT solver
on 44 cores Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2699 v4 2.20 Ghz.
These results are presented in this article. We also used SAT
solvers CaDiCaL, Treengeling and Lingeling. A description
of the solvers we used and their benchmarks is presented in
article [1]. The maximum time limit for solving a task was
set at 3600 seconds. During testing, it was assumed that after
finding a cycle with the length n, there would be no further
search for cycles with the length kn, where k is an integer
greater than 0.
A. Analysis of 80-bit NLFSR from stream cipher Grain-80
The Grain-80 stream cipher was proposed in [13]. It has
been selected for the final eSTREAM portfolio for profile 2 by
the eSTREAM project. Grain stream ciphers are designed pri-
marily for restricted hardware environments. The key stream
generator contains 80-bit NLFSR and an 80-bit LFSR. The
LFSR is known to have the maximum period of 280− 1 since
it uses a primitive generator polynomial of degree 80. The
period of NLFSR is unknown and its feedback function F is:
F (x0, ..., x79) = 1+x16+x19+x27+x34+x42+x46+x51+
x58+x64+x70+x79+x16x19+x42x46+x64x70+x19x27x34+
x46x51x58+x16x34x51x70+x19x27x42x46+x16x19x58x64+
x16x19x27x34x42 + x46x51x58x64x70 + x27x34x42x46x51x58
During testing of 80-bit NLFSR from a Grain-80 cipher
(results in table II) we rotated register in right, periods of
length 2 and 3 were detected. Furthermore, it was found that
the examined register does not include periods from length 5
to 55 (excluding cycles of length 2k and 3k, where k is an
integer greater than 0 -– those lengths were omitted from the
calculation). Found cycles we present in table III. In article [5]
and results show in table I the cycle of length 2 was not found.
Probably authors not consider of 1 which is add to NLFSR
feedback function in original specification of Grain80.
B. Analysis of 128-bit NLFSR from stream cipher Grain-128
The Grain-128 stream cipher was proposed in [3]. The
design is very small in hardware, and targets environments
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TABLE II














2 sat sat 0m 00.08s 0m 00.05s
3 sat sat 0m 00.07s 0m 00.06s
5 unsat unsat 0m 00.24s 0m 00.07s
7 unsat unsat 0m 00.24s 0m 00.09s
11 unsat unsat 0m 00.26s 0m 00.15s
13 unsat unsat 0m 00.34s 0m 00.18s
17 unsat unsat 0m 00.45s 0m 00.69s
19 unsat unsat 0m 00.81s 0m 01.02s
23 unsat unsat 0m 01.37s 0m 01.96s
25 unsat unsat 0m 03.22s 0m 04.19s
29 unsat unsat 0m 08.95s 0m 11.50s
31 unsat unsat 0m 10.03s 0m 10.92s
35 unsat unsat 0m 08.79s 0m 12.33s
37 unsat unsat 0m 11.57s 0m 10.64s
41 unsat unsat 1m 03.11s 0m 48.29s
43 unsat unsat 0m 42.09s 0m 33.52s
47 unsat unsat 7m 05.38s 3m 25.04s
49 unsat unsat 16m 24.07s 26m 15.56s
53 unsat timeout 58m 27.69s -------
55 unsat timeout 55m 26.48s -------
59 timeout timeout ------- -------
TABLE III




with very limited resources in gate count, power consumption,
and chip area. Similar to Grain-80, it contains 128-bit NLFSR
and 128-bit LFSR.
The LFSR is known to have the maximum period of 2128−1
since it uses a primitive generator polynomial of degree 128.
The period of NLFSR is unknown, and its feedback function
F is:
F (x0, ..., x127) = x127 + x101 + x71 + x36 + x31 + x124x60 +
x116x114 + x110x109 + x100x68 + x87x79 + x66x62 + x59x43
During testing of 128-bit NLFSR from a Grain-128 cipher
(results in table IV) we rotated register in right, periods of
length 7, 8 and 59 were detected. Furthermore, it was found
that the examined register does not include periods from length
2 to 44 (excluding cycles of length 7k and 8k, where k is an
integer greater than 0 — those lengths were omitted from the
calculation). Found cycles we present in table V.
C. Analysis of 128-bit NLFSR from stream cipher Grain-128a
The Grain-128a stream cipher was proposed in [10]. The
algorithm is a new version of Grain-128 and is strengthened
against all known attacks and observations, with built-in
support for optional authentication. The period of the new
128-bit NLFSR is also unknown, and its feedback function
F is:
TABLE IV














2 unsat unsat 0m 00.04s 0m 00.04s
3 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.04s
4 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.05s
5 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.07s
6 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.05s
7 sat sat 0m 00.06s 0m 00.06s
8 sat sat 0m 00.06s 0m 00.06s
9 unsat unsat 0m 00.07s 0m 00.11s
10 unsat unsat 0m 00.06s 0m 00.11s
11 unsat unsat 0m 00.09s 0m 00.10s
12 unsat unsat 0m 00.08s 0m 00.13s
13 unsat unsat 0m 00.09s 0m 00.12s
15 unsat unsat 0m 00.16s 0m 00.49s
17 unsat unsat 0m 00.17s 0m 00.64s
18 unsat unsat 0m 00.60s 0m 00.81s
19 unsat unsat 0m 00.93s 0m 01.42s
20 unsat unsat 0m 00.86s 0m 00.77s
22 unsat unsat 0m 01.07s 0m 01.34s
23 unsat unsat 0m 02.31s 0m 01.42s
25 unsat unsat 0m 02.23s 0m 02.47s
26 unsat unsat 0m 02.80s 0m 03.43s
27 unsat unsat 0m 08.94s 0m 08.04s
29 unsat unsat 0m 07.95s 0m 12.42s
30 unsat unsat 0m 08.42s 0m 06.53s
31 unsat unsat 0m 24.80s 0m 27.63s
33 unsat unsat 1m 07.11s 1m 08.25s
34 unsat unsat 0m 16.37s 0m 31.43s
36 unsat unsat 1m 15.63s 2m 20.12s
37 unsat unsat 0m 58.69s 1m 01.83s
38 unsat unsat 3m 16.68s 3m 33.52s
39 unsat unsat 0m 51.58s 1m 06.15s
41 unsat unsat 4m 39.11s 4m 46.36s
43 unsat unsat 17m 48.66s 15m 15.22s
44 unsat unsat 25m 56.06s 20m 06.97s
45 timeout timeout ------- -------
50 timeout timeout ------- -------
51 timeout timeout ------- -------
52 timeout timeout ------- -------
53 timeout timeout ------- -------
54 timeout timeout ------- -------
55 timeout timeout ------- -------
57 timeout timeout ------- -------
58 timeout timeout ------- -------
59 sat timeout 31m 58.28s -------
60 timeout timeout ------- -------
F (x0, ..., x127) = 1 + x31 + x36 + x71 + x101 + x127 +
x43x59 + x60x124 + x62x66x68x100 + x79x87 + x109x110 +
x114x116 + x45x49x57 + x102x103x105 + x32x34x35x39
During testing of 128-bit NLFSR from a Grain-128a cipher
(results in table VI) we rotated register in right, periods of
length 3, 31, 37 and 65 were detected. Furthermore, it was
found that the examined register does not include periods from
length 2 to 41 and length 44 (excluding cycles of length 3k,
31k and 37k, where k is an integer greater than 0 -– those
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TABLE V





lengths were omitted from the calculation). Found cycles we
present in table VII.
D. Analysis of Bivium and Trivium
We also applied the presented algorithm to Trivium [4]
stream ciphers and his simpler version Bivium [8]. Referring
to figure 1 in Bivium we can distinguish two LFSR’s: 93-bit
register A and 84-bit register B. The Internal state of Bivium
consists 177 bits.
Fig. 1. Bivium and Trivium stream ciphers
The Trivium stream cipher includes an additional 111-bit
register C. All used LFSRs are known to have the maximum
period, since Trivium uses a primitive generator polynomials
of degree 93, 84, 111. The internal state of Trivium consists
of 288 bits. Trivium was submitted to the profile 2 (hardware)
of the eSTREAM competition and has been selected as part
of the portfolio for low area hardware ciphers profile 2 by
the eSTREAM project [16]. It is not patented and has been
specified as an International Standard under ISO/IE. The
algorithm generates up to 264 bits of output keystream from
an 80-bit key and an 80-bit IV vector.
During testing Bivium key stream generator (results in ta-
ble VIII) were not included constants used in the initialization
step. A period of length 3 was detected. Furthermore, it was
found that the examined construction does not include periods
from length 2 to 46 or from length 52 to 55 (excluding cycles
of length 3k, where k is an integer greater than 0 — those
lengths were omitted from the calculation). Found cycle we
present in table IX (|| is bitwise concatenation).
During testing Trivium key stream generator (results in
table X) were not included constants used in the initialization
step of Trivium. Periods of length 3, 10 and 11 were detected.
Furthermore, it was found that the examined construction does
not include periods from length 2 to 31 (excluding cycles
TABLE VI














2 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.29s
3 sat sat 0m 00.04s 0m 00.33s
4 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.39s
5 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.27s
7 unsat unsat 0m 00.06s 0m 00.33s
8 unsat unsat 0m 00.05s 0m 00.30s
10 unsat unsat 0m 00.07s 0m 00.36s
11 unsat unsat 0m 00.07s 0m 00.41s
13 unsat unsat 0m 00.10s 0m 00.45s
14 unsat unsat 0m 00.09s 0m 00.51s
16 unsat unsat 0m 00.39s 0m 00.79s
17 unsat unsat 0m 00.17s 0m 01.00s
19 unsat unsat 0m 01.38s 0m 02.01s
20 unsat unsat 0m 01.00s 0m 01.68s
22 unsat unsat 0m 01.16s 0m 02.15s
23 unsat unsat 0m 02.11s 0m 02.55s
25 unsat unsat 0m 05.51s 0m 06.29s
26 unsat unsat 0m 04.11s 0m 04.49s
28 unsat unsat 0m 04.00s 0m 05.18s
29 unsat unsat 0m 11.42s 0m 18.47s
31 sat sat 0m 01.11s 0m 06.75s
32 unsat unsat 0m 30.62s 0m 54.72s
34 unsat unsat 0m 30.00s 1m 22.09s
35 unsat unsat 0m 35.77s 0m 46.86s
37 sat sat 0m 03.84s 0m 10.74s
38 unsat timeout 19m 19.39s -------
40 unsat unsat 2m 05.77s 5m 17.70s
41 unsat timeout 29m 58.56s -------
43 timeout timeout ------- -------
44 unsat unsat 17m 45.83s 47m 14.03s
46 timeout timeout ------- -------
47 timeout timeout ------- -------
49 timeout timeout ------- -------
50 timeout timeout ------- -------
52 timeout timeout ------- -------
53 timeout timeout ------- -------
55 timeout timeout ------- -------
56 timeout timeout ------- -------
58 timeout timeout ------- -------
59 timeout timeout ------- -------
61 timeout timeout ------- -------
64 timeout timeout ------- -------
65 timeout sat ------- 57m 56.46s
of length 3k, 10k and 11k, where k is an integer greater
than 0 -– those lengths were omitted from the calculation).
We also examined Trivium with key stream generators as
included constants used in the initialization step, but no cycles
were found from length 2 to 177. Found cycles we present in
table XI.
E. Manualy generation of equantions versus automated gen-
eration of equantions
In our experiments we used two methods to generate equa-
tions in algebraic normal form: manual (based on handwritten
equations) and automated (based on AIG graphs). The main
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TABLE VII














2 unsat 0m 00.05s
3 sat 0m 00.03s
4 unsat 0m 00.03s
5 unsat 0m 00.03s
7 unsat 0m 00.03s
8 unsat 0m 00.04s
10 unsat 0m 00.05s
11 unsat 0m 00.08s
13 unsat 0m 00.05s
14 unsat 0m 00.07s
16 unsat 0m 00.10s
17 unsat 0m 00.17s
19 unsat 0m 00.24s
20 unsat 0m 00.33s
22 unsat 0m 00.36s
23 unsat 0m 00.08s
25 unsat 0m 00.32s
26 unsat 0m 00.06s
28 unsat 0m 00.44s
29 unsat 0m 01.67s
31 unsat 0m 05.69s
32 unsat 0m 01.01s
34 unsat 0m 28.18s
35 unsat 0m 04.36s
37 unsat 3m 19.98s
38 unsat 2m 22.31s
40 unsat 0m 01.78s
41 unsat 0m 00.37s
43 unsat 53m 20.32s
44 unsat 39m 57.73s




52 unsat 0m 03.90s
53 unsat 58m 16.13s
55 unsat 0m 40.02s
56 timeout -------
differences between the two sets are the number of equations
and the maximal algebraic degree. For the method based on
handwritten equations, the maximal algebraic degree depends
on the form of the NLFSR feedback function, and for the
method based on AIG graphs, the maximal algebraic degree
is always equal to 2. This is a natural consequence of the
construction of AIG graphs. For this reason, the number of
equations is higher when the second method is used.
TABLE IX
CYCLES FOUND IN BIVIUM
(WITHOUT CONSTANTSUSED IN THE INITIALIZATION STEP).












2 unsat 0m 00,05s
3 sat 0m 00,06s
4 unsat 0m 00,07s
5 unsat 0m 00,07s
7 unsat 0m 00,09s
8 unsat 0m 00,09s
10 sat 0m 00,14s
11 sat 0m 00,09s
13 unsat 0m 00,07s
14 unsat 0m 00,14s
16 unsat 0m 00,31s
17 unsat 0m 00,37s
19 unsat 0m 01,14s
23 unsat 0m 00,11s
25 unsat 0m 14,38s
26 unsat 0m 00,11s
28 unsat 2m 49,88s
29 unsat 0m 00,11s
31 unsat 51m 54,39s
32 timeout -------
The task in the CNF can be characterized by the number of
variables and the number of clauses. Due to the ANF systems
from which our CNF tasks were generated, it was typical
that CNF systems generated from the AIG based method
had many more variables and clauses than those generated
from handwritten equations. In both cases, it is clear that the
increase in both indicators is linear. The relevant dependencies
are shown in figure 2 and 3.
Fig. 2. Number of variables in CNF on n-th iterationfor Grain-80
Despite the significant differences between CNF generated
by the handwritten equations method and the AIG graph
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TABLE XI
CYCLES FOUND IN TRIVIUM











Fig. 3. Number of clauses in CNF on n-th iterationfor Grain-80
method, the time to find solutions is similar. The time dif-
ference is due to heuristic methods of solving the CNF task
by Plingeling SAT solver. Considering this fact, it is difficult
to assess which method of generating equations is better. Both
methods allow the occurrence of short cycles in tested NLFSRs
and stream ciphers to be easily checked.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, our experiments discovered short cycles in the
NLFSRs used in Grain-80, Grain-128 and Grain-128a stream
ciphers (all examineted registers are nonsingular in case when
they will be rotate in right) and also in stream ciphers Bivium
and Trivium (without constants used in the initialization step).
Furthermore, by obtaining proof of the contradiction of the
SAT problem, we also determined the number of iterations
for which such cycles do not exist.
The time needed to find a cycle or proof of its absence is
better than that of the algorithm used in [5]. This is clearly
shown as the iteration of the given transformation increases.
This fact allowed us to evaluate a larger range of iterations
than was tested in [5]. Unfortunately, due to the nature of
the SAT problem, it we did not estimated the computational
and memory complexity. This is the main disadvantage with
respect to the method proposed in [5].
In the future, we want to use the divide-and-conquer strategy
in solving SAT. We believe that this approach can significantly
reduce the calculation time, which will allow for evaluation of
a larger range of iterations.
In our opinion, the presented method may prove to be a
good approach to check whether a given iterated cryptographic
algorithm has short cycles. Certainly, it is useful when no other
algorithms exist (except brute force) to check this property (i.e.
in the case of NLFSR). It can also be useful in determining
the distribution of cycles of tested transformation.
From the cryptanalysis point of view, it will be interesting to
check how the cycles found affect the security of the examined
algorithms. The occurrence of short cycles in the key stream
generator in practice discredits such an algorithm
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